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LAWYERS AND CHILDREN: WISDOM AND 
LEGITIMACY IN FAMILY POLICY 
Carl E. Schneider* 
IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY. By Robert H. Mnookin, Robert A. Burt, David L. 
Chambers, Michael S. Wald, Stephen D. Sugarman, Franklin E. Zim-
ring, and Rayman L. Solomon. New York: W.H. Freeman & Co. 
1985. Pp. xii, 572. Cloth, $22.95; paper, $15.95. 
In the Interest of Children is a fine book. It is a fine book because it 
embodies an admirable idea and executes it ably. Its fault, if it has one, 
lies in doing so excellently what it does that it cannot do a little more. 
To entice you to read In the Interest of Children, I will summarize it, 
criticize it briefly, and then discuss its themes. , 
I. WHAT DOES THE BOOK SAY? 
The Introduction 
The book's admirable idea is to answer the question whether "test-
case litigation [is] a sensible way to promote the welfare of children" 
(p. ix) by anatomizing five examples of test-case litigation, not just in 
terms of their doctrinal bases and implications, but also by investigat-
ing how they came to be litigated; what tactical, ethical, social, and 
institutional issues they raised and how they resolved them; and what 
social and legal consequences they had. Professor Robert H. 
Mnookin, of the Stanford Law School, provides an extensive introduc-
tion which describes the setting and importance of these questions and 
proposes ways of addressing them. He begins by emphasizing the spe-
cial difficulties of making policy for children: 
Two fundamental problems typically confront a policymaker trying 
to make a rational decision about the best interests of children. The first, 
the predictlon problem, is that it is often exceedingly difficult to predict 
the consequences of alternative children's policies. The second, the value 
problem, arises from the difficulty of selecting the criteria that should be 
used to evaluate the alternative consequences. [pp. 16-17; emphasis in 
original] 
Professor Mnookin suggests the prediction and the value problems are 
so frequent and severe that "easy cases are the exception, not the rule" 
(p. 24). The identity of the decisionmaker thus becomes crucial. Since 
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this book studies test-case litigation, it investigates the role of the 
judge not just in deciding cases, but in writing policy. The power of 
American judges to make public policy was exemplified and made glo-
rious by Brown v. Board of Education. 1 Yet how far judges should 
write policy, Professor Mnoo1dn notes, depends on their capacity and 
on the legitimacy of their power: 
The capacity question is essentially a practical issue: is the adversarial 
process oflitigation an effective way to make sound policy decisions and 
create and enforce remedies? The legitimacy issue poses a fundamental 
question of political theory: can policymaking by courts in a democracy 
be squared with majority rule and popular control? [p. 25] 
Professor Mnookin shows how these two questions of judicial author-
ity interact with the prediction and value problems to make test-case 
litigation about children specially troubling. He cites, for example, the 
indeterminacy of the constitutional status of children, the uncertainty 
whether children's political powerlessness justifies judicial activism on 
their behalf, and the disagreement over what policies any such activ-
ism should prefer. 
Professor Mnookin argues that the role of the child's lawyer is 
hardly less problematic than the role of the judge: "Children need ad-
vocates because, in most circumstances, young persons cannot speak 
for and defend their own interests. And yet, because children often 
cannot define their own interests, how can the advocate know for cer-
tain what those interests are?" (p. 43). Not only can lawyers for chil-
dren not rely on clients to define their own interests; lawyers in test-
case litigation represent whole classes of children whose interests may 
conflict. The lawyer thus has both the benefit of an unfettered choice 
of policies to advocate for children and the burden of making that 
choice. 
The Case Studies 
Professor Mnookin's introduction having posed the problem of 
test-case litigation for children, the book embarks on its five case stud-
ies. Because these are intrinsically interesting, because they are the 
heart of the book, and because I will shortly attempt to generalize 
about them, they deserve to be summarized here. 
The first case study is of Smith v. Organization of Foster Families 
for Equality and Reform (OFFER) 2 and is by Professor David L. 
Chambers, of the University of Michigan Law School, and Professor 
Michael S. Wald, of the Stanford Law School. OFFER began with a 
real client, Madeleine Smith, who had a real problem - that child-
welfare authorities in New York City wished to remove her foster chil-
dren from her home. Ms. Smith persuaded Marcia Lowry, a lawyer 
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). 
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with the Children's Rights Project of the New York Civil Liberties 
Union, to represent her and her foster children. Ms. Lawry's com-
plaint argued that foster pare:µts who have cared for a child for at least 
a year have a constitutionally protected interest in the child such that 
he may not be moved (even to be returned to his natural parents) with-
out a prior hearing more complete than those then provided for by 
New York State and New York City. Louise Gans, a lawyer on the 
staff of Community Action for Legal Services, intervened on behalf of 
the class of natural parents with children in foster care; Helen But-
tenwieser, a lawyer whose clients included private agencies that han-
dled foster care, was appointed by the three-judge district court to 
represent the class of foster children. After a one-day trial, the court 
held that foster children have a constitutional right to a hearing before 
a transfer, that the foster parents could not waive the right, and that 
therefore such a hearing must precede any transfer. The Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that it did not have to decide whether foster 
parents and children have a constitutionally protected interest in their 
relationship because New York's procedures already met the standard 
of due process required where such an interest is governmentally 
infringed. 
Doctrinally, OFFER was anti-climactic. Practically, OFFER had 
some immediate effects: Early in the litigation, the authorities decided 
not to remove Ms. Smith's foster children; later in the litigation New 
York City (but not New York State) instituted formal hearings for 
foster children being transferred to another foster home. Ultimately, 
however, Professors Chambers and Wald conclude that 
the new rules do not appear to have brought substantial change to the 
system either directly or by inspiring changes elsewhere. . . . Each year 
since 1975, there have been more than one thousand ... transfers, but, 
for only twenty or thirty of them were hearings held. It is nonetheless 
true that in about 45 percent of the hearings that are held, the agency 
decision is reversed. [p. 115] 
In the Interest of Children's second case study is of Bellotti v. Baird 
and is by Professor Mnookin. In 1974, Massachusetts enacted a law 
that required any unmarried minor seeking an abortion to have the 
consent of her parents or, if her parents denied consent, of a judge. 
Bill Baird, who operated a Boston abortion clinic,3 filed an action 
claiming the statute violated the equal protection clause. A group of 
parents intervened in favor of the statute. A three-judge district court 
held a three-day hearing and, with one dissent, found the law uncon-
stitutional, but the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court for an "authoritative construction" 
3. Baird had also operated the first abortion and birth control clinic in the country, and he 
may be remembered as the defendant in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
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of the statute.4 After receiving that construction, the federal district 
court held a second brief trial and again found the law unconstitu-
tional. During that proceeding, a coalition including the Planned 
Parenthood League of Massachusetts was allowed to intervene as a 
plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's result with 
only one dissent, but it split 4-4 over its reasons.5 Justice Powell's 
opinion for one bloc advised states that they may require parental con-
sent to a minor's abortion if the minor can, without notifying her par-
ents, seek a judicial finding that an abortion is in her best interests or 
that she is "mature" enough to decide for herself whether to have an 
abortion. The Massachusetts legislature passed such a statute, and, 
after nearly seven years of litigation, it went into effect. 
Professor Mnookin reports that hearings under the statute are 
prompt, brief, and informal. But his most striking conclusion is that 
''[e]very pregnant minor who has sought judicial authorization for an 
abortion has secured an abortion" (p. 239; emphasis in original). In 
the statute's first two years, some 1300 girls sought such authorization. 
Ninety percent of them were found mature enough to decide for them-
selves to have an abortion; an abortion was found to be in the best 
interests of ten percent; and five girls were originally denied an abor-
tion, of whom four were granted one on appeal and one had her abor-
tion in another state. Whether more teenagers benefit or suffer 
because of the statute is a question Professor Mnookin discusses 
searchingly but believes cannot be answered. 
The third study is of Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and 
Hospital 6 and is by Professor Robert Burt, of the Yale Law School. 
Pennhurst is a Pennsylvania state institution for the retarded. In the 
1960s Pennsylvania began to "deinstitutionalize," but by 1974, 1400 
people still lived in Pennhurst in "hellish" conditions. Winifred Hald-
erman, the mother of one of its residents, brought suit seeking both 
institutional improvements and monetary damages against state offi-
cials. In 1975, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens in-
tervened as a plaintiff, and in 1976 it asked that Pennhurst be closed 
and its inmates transferred to small residences. In 197 6, a federal dis-
trict court held a thirty-two-day trial and heard eighty witnesses, in-
cluding experts, parents of Pennhurst residents, former Pennhurst 
residents, and Pennhurst staff. In 1977, the court ordered Pennhurst 
closed, saying that "all the parties in this litigation" had agreed that 
Pennhurst residents "should be living in the community."? In 1979, 
the Third Circuit affirmed; in 1981, the Supreme Court reversed; in 
1982, the Third Circuit reaffirmed on different grounds; and in 1984, 
4. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). 
5. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
6. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
7. 446 F. Supp. at 1312. 
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the Supreme Court again reversed. Later in 1984, the state agreed to 
close Pennhurst by July 1, 1986. In the meantime, however, a group 
of parents of Pennhurst residents had asked the court not to close 
Pennhurst, and they won a ruling that no one could be removed from 
Pennhurst without a hearing. These parents did not join in the settle-
ment reached in 1984. 
The consequences of Pennhurst are unclear, since the settlement 
was agreed upon while the book was in production. However, Profes-
sor Burt describes a common element "in the relations among all the 
Pennhurst parties: [a progression] from initial efforts to find common 
ground by overlooking potential conflicts to ultimate discord and re-
crimination" (p. 289). Mrs. Halderman and her lawyer eventually dis-
agreed about which of them spoke for Terri Lee, the Pennhurst 
parents eventually disagreed about whether Pennhurst should be 
closed, the experts eventually disagreed about deinstitutionalization, 
and the plaintiffs and defendants eventually disagreed about how 
Pennhurst should be administered. Professor Burt argues that the 
basic question for our inquiry is whether litigation can be conducted in 
ways that at least do not feed this [erosion of mutuality]; and whether, at 
best, litigation might interrupt and redirect this impetus in order to build 
a firmer communal foundation from the evident impulse among all par-
ties toward initial mutual support .... [pp. 324-25] 
The fourth case study is of Roe v. Norton 8 and is by Professor Ste-
phen D. Sugarman, of the University of California at Berkeley School 
of Law. In 1971, responding to its own inclinations and to pressure 
from the federal government, Connecticut passed a statute threatening 
with jail for contempt of court any mother receiving Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children who refused to identify the father of any of 
her children who were AFDC beneficiaries. Two legal-aid lawyers 
had clients who wished not to provide that information, and cases they 
filed were consolidated before a three-judge district court. The court, 
sua sponte, appointed a former legal-aid lawyer to represent the class 
of children of such mothers. In 1973, after a one-day trial, the court 
upheld the statute. On appeal, the American Civil Liberties Union, 
the Children's Defense Fund, and the Welfare Law Center contributed 
amicus briefs. However, the Supreme Court remanded for reconsider-
ation in light of new federal legislation withholding benefits from un-
cooperative mothers. In 1975, that legislation was amended to excuse 
mothers who had "good cause for refusing to cooperate ... in accord-
ance with standards prescribed by [HEW], which standards shall take 
into consideration the best interests of the child ... " (p. 418). HEW's 
standards were not proposed until August 1976 and were not final un-
8. Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated sub nom. Roe v. Norton, 422 
U.S. 391 (1975), on remand sub nom. Doe v. Maher, 414 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Conn. 1976), vacated, 
432 U.S. 526 (1977). 
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til December 1978, after long lobbying and legislative and administra-
tive debate. 
Professor Sugarman concludes that "[t]he rules governing coerced 
maternal cooperation in Connecticut today resemble those before 
1969" (p. 429). The class of exceptions is narrow. True, "[t]he excep-
tions are more clearly spelled out today than in 1968 and only the 
mother's share of AFDC is at risk." Yet Professor Sugarman believes 
"these differences are largely irrelevant in practice" (p. 429). He ar-
gues that we cannot tell whether more children are helped than hurt 
by these standards. 
The final study is of Goss v. Lopez9 and is by Professor Franklin E. 
Zimring, then of the University of Chicago Law School, and Mr. Ray-
man L. Solomon, of the American Bar Foundation. In 1971, after 
racial disturbances, a number of black students in Columbus, Ohio, 
were suspended from school without a hearing. At the instance of the 
local NAACP, and with the help of a federally funded Center for Law 
and Education, a suit was filed challenging the Ohio statute that per-
mitted suspensions without a hearing. In 1972, after a one-day trial, a 
three-judge district court held the su'spensions unconstitutional. 
Although the Columbus school board had meanwhile instituted proce-
dures close to those ordered by the district court, the defendants ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court affirmed by a five-to-four vote, but it held 
only that "students facing suspension [for ten days or fewer] and the 
consequent interference with a protected property interest must be 
given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing." 10 
Professor Zimring and Mr. Solomon argue that the consequences 
of Goss have been much exaggerated: The due process now required 
for short-term suspension is hardly more than a conversation between 
administrator and student and is thus hardly more than commonly 
existed before Goss. They contend that, if school life has become "le-
galized," the change has primarily to do with mainstreaming and de-
segregation and the judicial participation in school affairs those 
reforms have brought. 
The Final Observations 
Professor Mnookin concludes In the Interest of Children with some 
brief but probing final observations. He sees the case studies as raising 
the question of how power over children's lives should be allocated 
among children, parents, and the various branches of government. 
More particularly, the cases dealt "primarily with the needs of poor 
children, minority children, and children with special handicaps" (p. 
514). He proposes that "the dilemma of legitimacy ... is perhaps less 
9. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
10. 419 U.S. at 579 (emphasis in original). 
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troublesome when courts intervene on behalf of children with ex-
traordinary needs" (p. 514), since such children both need more from 
the state and are less likely to have parents politically able to help 
them get it. Nevertheless, the prediction and value problems remain, 
and - exactly because such children and their parents lack power -
the problem of the advocate's accountability is intensified. 
Turning to the judicial role, Professor Mnookin finds that "the liti-
gation process is not always a deliberative, methodical, rational way of 
arriving at a decision" (p. 517), and he reminds us that the choice of 
the judicial forum shapes the way a policy question is framed, the in-
fluence of the possible actors, and the nature of the answer. However, 
he observes that, in these five cases, courts often looked for com-
promises or for ways of transmuting substantive disputes into due pro-
cess solutions. "In sum these studies suggest that the courts have been 
very modest in what they are willing to do" (p. 521). They are neither 
the imperial judiciary of their critics' fears nor the bold reformers of 
their enthusiasts' hopes. 
II. How WELL DOES THE BOOK SAY IT? 
One feature of legal scholarship as irritating as any other is its 
long-standing, long-deplored resistance to investigating how legal doc-
trine is actually formulated and to studying empirically the conse-
quences of legal doctrines. Happily, in family law, such a literature has 
begun to develop, as variously exemplified by Barbara Nelson's Mak-
ing an Issue of Child Abuse, Jeanne Giovannoni and Rosina Becerra's 
Defining Child Abuse, Gilbert Steiner's The Futility of Family Policy, 
Kristin Luker's Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood, and David 
Chambers' Making Fathers Pay. In the Interest of Children is a wel-
come and estimable addition to that literature from some of family 
law's most distinguished students. 
The book's successes are manifest and manifold. At the simplest 
level, it tells good stories. (The intricate unfoldings of Smith v. OF-
FER and of Bellotti v. Baird are limned with special craft and grace.) 
More significantly, the book serves well its original purpose of investi-
gating how "child advocates" function. (Professors Wald and Cham-
bers have especially thoughtful things to say about the ethical and 
practical problems of lawyers who represent children in test cases.) 
Absorbing as such lawyers will find In the Interest of Children, a gen-
eral audience will find much to admire as well. The book sets each 
case in a social and a legal context, so that we may see why it devel-
oped and how it looked to the litigators and the judges. (Professor 
Zimring and Mr. Solomon's exposition of the social context of Goss v. 
Lopez is particularly illuminating.) The authors are sensitive to the 
ways courts interact with legislatures and bureaucracies. (Professor 
Mnookin and Professor Sugarman provide notably enlightening de-
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scriptions of how social policy emerged from diverse·political institu-
tions.) The book examines the actual consequences of the holdings in 
the cases, and in virtually every instance those examinations are star-
tling and provocative. Finally, Professor Mnookin's lucid and in-
sightful introductory analysis and concluding observations provide the 
kind of broad-ranging view of family law problems that the literature 
so much needs. 11 
All this being so, it seems churlish to ask for more. But since I 
hope this book will inspire imitation, I must mention a few disappoint-
ments with it. The authors are flatly uninformative about method. 
Much of their information obviously came from interviews, but we 
never learn who was interviewed or how, what questions were asked, 
or what the relationships were between the authors (about whom 
nothing can be discovered from the book) and the people they studied. 
We are told virtually nothing about how the cases studied were se-
lected, about their typicality, pr about kinds of public interest litiga-
tion involving children which are not represented in the book. Indeed, 
"test-case litigation to promote the welfare of children" may not be an 
entirely usual, or even useful, category. Certainly each of these cases 
might readily be categorized differently: OFFER as an administrative 
hearings case, Bellotti as an abortion case, Pennhurst as a large-institu-
tions or handicapped's rights case, Norton as a welfare-rights case, and 
Goss as a race or school case. And, although a large literature has 
grown up relating to a number of the book's topics - public interest 
litigation, institutional litigation, class actions, due process fetishism, 
foster-care programs, deinstitutionalization, and so on - little of it is 
discussed. Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the book is its 
reluctance to generalize from the cases. Considering the length of the 
book, this reluctance is quite understandable. Nevertheless, the reader 
is left anxious to know more about what the authors make of the case 
studies as a whole. Professor Mnookin's final observations are sensible 
and sensitive, but they make hungry where most they satisfy. In the 
rest of this review, then, I will proffer some speculations the book 
might stimulate - recognizing, of course, that any conclusions based 
on only five cases must be tentative, but also recognizing that the pro-
verbial journey begins with a single step. 
III. WHAT CAN WE MAKE OF WHAT THE BOOK SAYS? 
In the Interest of Children is about how well and how legitimately 
family law policy can be made through constitutional "test-case" liti-
gation. As Professor Mnookin observes, both judicial success and ju-
dicial legitimacy depend on judicial capacity to identify standards for 
11. See Schneider, The Next Step: Definition, Generalization, and Theory in American Fam· 
ily Law, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1039 (1985), for an argument that such studies have not been, but 
should be, written. 
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measuring the "best interests" of children and to apply those stan-
dards to particular cases. In constitutional litigation, these questions 
of capacity depend on the clarity of the constitutional text, on the liti-
gants• ability to identify and articulate their own interests and thereby 
provide the court information it needs with which to make policy, and 
on the court's ability to analyze and remedy the problems a case raises. 
In the Interest of Children raises doubts about each of these three 
factors. 
The first factor - the clarity of the constitutional text - is impor-
tant as one method of resolving what Professor Mnookin calls the 
"value problem,'' the problem of deciding what criteria should be used 
in choosing between policies for children. In this respect, the cases 
described in In the Interest of Children may usefully be compared with 
Brown v. Board of Education. However many complexities the Court 
may subsequently have encountered in its school-desegregation 
travails, it was guided in Brown by a constitutional provision widely 
understood to make a basic moral and social statement about govern-
ment and race. While that statement could be implemented in many 
ways, its importance, strength, and (relative) simplicity gave unity and 
direction to the Court's labors. None of the authors of In the Interest 
of Children, on the other hand, really suggests that genuine guidance 
can be inferred from the various texts that have been thought relevant 
to children's issues, and even Professor Mnookin's intimation that 
children might be a "discrete and insular minority" (pp. 41-42) seems 
half-hearted and perhaps not intended to convince. In any event, since 
much has been written before about these controversies, little need be 
said here. 
As to the other questions of judicial capacity, however, the book 
provides evidence from which some generalizations might be inferred, 
particularly about the interaction of what Professor Mnookin calls the 
"prediction problem" - the difficulty of predicting the consequences 
of alternative children's policies - with questions of judicial capacity 
and legitimacy. Each of the book's authors stresses the complexity of 
the social problems at issue in each case. Each author demonstrates 
tellingly what is therefore hardly surprising - that systematic empiri-
cal information and skill in analyzing it are needed for understanding 
the social problems each case concerned. Each author also demon-
strates that the complexity of these problems, obvious as it seems, is 
either unperceived or disregarded by the makers of judicial family pol-
icy. What inferences can be drawn, then, from In the Interest of Chil-
dren about the success and legitimacy of test-case litigation in light of 
the fact that lawyers and judges need this kind of information and 
skill? 
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A. The Independence of the "Child Advocate" 
Judges learn about the social problems a case presents primarily 
from the lawyers who argue it. Judges depend on lawyers to identify 
accurately the interests of their clients and to relate fully the informa-
tion that supports the policies that are in the interests of those clients. 
Lawyers, in turn, depend on their clients, whom we expect to know 
their own situations and to bear the consequences of ignorance. And 
ordinarily lawyers are constrained, if not controlled, by their clients: 
they need clients before they can bring suit, they are ethically required 
to serve the client's interest as the client understands it, they learn 
about the client's problems through the client, and if the client wishes 
to settle the case, the lawyer is obliged to oblige. But in test-case liti-
gation involving children, it is exactly the problem that children can-
not speak for themselves. (Indeed, it is the fact that children lack a 
voice in government that, in the minds of many of its practitioners, 
justifies such litigation.) Thus what is perhaps most striking about the 
litigation described in In the Interest of Children is that, in each case, 
lawyers were in a meaningful sense not constrained by clients: the 
hand was the hand of the client, but the voice was the voice of the 
lawyer. 
What is the nature of this independence? How does it affect the 
choice of interests and policies to be urged on the judge? How does it 
affect the provision of information to the judge? To these questions we 
now turn. 
The "child advocates' " independence of their clients in test-case 
litigation has, as In the Interest of Children reveals, many sources. 
The first of these sources is one Professor Mnookin emphasizes: the 
clients are children and therefore cannot make decisions or speak for 
themselves. Children's decisions are usually made by their parents, 
and thus children's lawyers are ordinarily instructed by children's par-
ents. But in cases like OFFER, Bellotti, Norton, and, as it developed, 
even Pennhurst, the question whether the parent was serving the 
child's interest was itself at issue. Furthermore, even where, as in OF-
FER and Norton, lawyers represented adults, those adults often did 
not control the lawyer: Not only did someone other than the client 
pay the lawyer, but the named clients in each case except Pennhurst 
dropped out of the case fairly early, their individual problems having 
been solved. Indeed, some named clients were hardly in the case at all, 
since, as happened most conspicuously in OFFER and most questiona-
bly in Bellotti (pp. 172-73), they were recruited by the lawyers ex-
pressly to allow the lawyers to represent particular points of view. 
The lawyers described in In the Interest of Children were, then, 
generally not controlled by named clients. The lawyers' freedom was 
enhanced by the facts that, in each case, at least some of the lawyers 
represented either a class or a group of clients and that, in each case, 
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the interests of the members of the class conflicted. (Even in Penn-
hurst, where the parents had formed an unusually active and sophisti-
cated association, some parents eventually moved to intervene to 
oppose the association's attempt to close the institution.) The diver-
sity of the class' interests helped free the lawyers to pick for them-
selves the interests to be urged upon the court. Thus, for instance, one 
lawyer in OFFER declined even to meet her named clients on the 
ground that "it would be a 'trap' to become embroiled in arguing 
about the fates of a few children when the real issues at stake were so 
much broader" (p. 93). 
Similar problems with the lawyers' role appear in many, perhaps 
most, kinds of public interest litigation. Often, however, such litiga-
tion is paid for and controlled by organizations whose members are 
themselves members of the group whose ill treatment the lawyers hope 
to correct. Those interest groups may have some ability to instruct 
and supervise their lawyers. Even such groups, of course, can have 
real difficulties overseeing lawyers, partly because lawyers sometimes 
claim exclusive expertise in deciding whether and how to litigate.12 
But what is striking about the lawyers described in In the Interest of 
Children is that so many of them initiated suits and conducted litiga-
tion quite without genuine supervision from their organizational 
clients. 
In short, in each of the cases studied at least one of the lawyers 
operated quite independently. In OFFER, Norton, Goss, and Bellotti, 
clients neither employed nor supervised lawyers. In Pennhurst the cli-
ent - the parents' organization - does appear to have supervised its 
lawyers, but its decisions provoked some of the parents to oppose the 
original suit. And Pennhurst provides one of the most disturbing ex-
amples of the problems of deciding for whom a lawyer speaks. Penn-
hurst had begun when Mrs. Halderman, concerned about her severely 
retarded daughter's treatment at Pennhurst, hired a lawyer who filed 
suit on behalf of "Terri Lee Halderman, a retarded citizen, by her 
mother and guardian, Winifred Halderman" (p. 284). Later, however, 
the lawyer announced that his client was Terri Lee and that he would 
not accept instruction from Mrs. Halderman, on the grounds that par-
ents and institutionalized children have inherently conflicting interests 
(p. 286). 
If these lawyers are often neither instructed by their clients nor 
supervised by their employers, how do they decide what the public 
interest is and what policies to advocate for children? In the Interest 
of Children says little about this question, possibly because the lawyers 
themselves seem hardly to have considered it. One would suppose 
12. For an illuminating discussion of how inferest groups decided to participate as amici in 
Bakke and of the influence of lawyers over those groups, see T. O'NEILL, BAKKE AND THE 
POLITICS OF EQUALITY (1985) (reviewed in this issue). 
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(and the book sometimes intimates) that lawyers' policy preferences 
are drawn from their experiences with other clients and opponents, 
informed by their ideological opinions and their law school training. 
But given the inexperience of many of these lawyers, given the ines-
capable narrowness of their training, given the lawyer's necessarily 
limited perspective on a client's problems, and given the prejudice 
with which lawyers come to view their opponents' positions, the law-
yer's experience seems a disconcerting basis for making policy choices 
in so complex an area as family law. Nevertheless, the lawyers who 
were asked seemed sanguine about relying on it. One of the NYCLU's 
lawyers in OFFER, for example, thought that children's rights litiga-
tion does not "raise such sophisticated issues that you need develop-
ment experts" (p. 136). And none of the lawyers in that difficult case 
"saw any need for expert advice for guidance regarding the positions 
to advance" (p. 133). 
The independence of the child's advocate from the child and even 
from those who hire him raises, then, two kinds of questions. First, 
how well can the child advocate inform courts? Second, how does the 
child advocate's independence affect the legitimacy of judicial deci-
sions that purport to evaluate the constitutional adequacy of a legisla-
tive policy or to compensate for the child's nonrepresentation in the 
elected branches of government? The seriousness of these questions 
will depend in part on the capacity of courts to understand and solve 
problems of public policy for children, and we will now ask what light 
In the Interest of Children sheds on that capacity. 
B. The Capacity of Courts 
However troubling it is that lawyers who are freed to formulate 
positions on public policy seem ill-suited to do so, the adversary pro-
cess and judicial insight might nevertheless flush out all that judges 
need to know to make wise policy. In the Interest of Children, how-
ever, suggests reasons to doubt that this happens. We begin with the 
set of reasons that has to do with a court's ability to collect and inter-
pret information in test-case litigation. 
The first kind of problem in this respect was that these proceedings 
too often lacked the virtues and yet had the faults of an adversary 
system of justice. For example, an adversary system depends on a 
rough equality between the lawyers for each side. But in each of these 
cases, the government's lawyers seem to have been badly outmatched: 
The public interest lawyers tended to come from better law Schools 
and to have greater resources - money, time, research services, and 
the like - than their opponents. Thus, the state's position often seems 
to have been, relatively, weakly presented. An adversary system, par-
ticularly one relied on to formulate social policy in a large and baffling 
area, also depends on some genuine adverseness between the parties to 
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generate evidence and sharpen argument. In these cases, however, the 
evidence presented to the courts was limited by the fact that, at some 
point in each of the cases, the parties had only slight differences. In 
Goss, for instance, the school committee early in the litigation adopted 
disciplinary procedures somewhat more favorable than those the 
Supreme Court eventually ordered, and throughout the litigation the 
defendants "perceived the case as having only one issue: did Ohio law 
grant them autonomy in maintaining discipline in the schools?" (p. 
473). The defendants (and concomitantly the plaintiffs) therefore in-
troduced virtually no evidence to the court. Even in Pennhurst, the 
defendants said they wanted and intended to do what the plaintiffs 
asked - close the institution. Consequently, "there was virtually no _ 
controversy about institutional closure until some considerable time 
after the trial had ended" (p. 273). 
Not only were some of the adversary system's advantages for col-
lecting information absent in these cases, but some of its impediments 
were present. In each case, for example, the lawyers seem not to have 
believed that representing the public interest obliged them to depart 
from the usual practice of exploiting every ethical litigational advan-
tage. Thus lawyers for children opposed the appointment of addi-
tional lawyers who might have represented more fully the interests of 
all the children in the class (p. 141), attempted to limit the witnesses 
and issues presented to courts (p. 141), and used technicalities to pre-
vent a case from being heard on appeal (p. 378). 
This brings us to the second kind of limit on the court's ability to 
collect information in test-case litigation involving children: The hear-
ing in each of the cases was stunningly inadequate. In none of the 
cases was there a genuine trial of the major issues at stake; except for 
Pennhurst, hearings lasted from only one to three days. This brevity 
was sometimes commanded by the court13 and sometimes caused by 
the parties. In either event, the court learned little about the named 
parties, the class, the immediate problem, or the larger social issues. 
Much of the evidence presented related to the named plaintiffs, partly 
for tactical reasons and partly, one suspects, because that is what law-
yers customarily do. Yet in test-case litigation, anecdotes about a few 
individuals can rarely be enlightening and are often misleading. And 
little though the trial judges could have learned from these hearings, 
the appellate judges who finally decided those cases surely learned 
even less, since it is unlikely that they read the full trial record. 
The third limit on the judicial capacity to collect information is 
that to ask lawyers in "social policy" cases to be genuinely and thor-
13. One reason the hearings were brief was apparently that each case except Pennhurst was 
originally heard by a three-judge federal district court, an institution whose clumsiness and com-
position may deter prolonged trials. The virtual abolition of that institution may have eliminated 
one cause of perfunctory hearings. 
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oughly illuminating is to ask a great deal. Each author of In the Inter-
est of Children devastatingly shows the inadequacy of the social 
information presented in these cases. To some extent, systematic evi-
dence was simply unavailable. To a considerable extent, the lawyers 
failed to grasp the relevance of what was available or to use experts to 
inform themselves and the court. Where systematic evidence was 
available and where lawyers tried to use it, its complexity and ambigu-
ity prevented lawyers from effectively gathering, analyzing, and 
presenting it, and courts from assimilating it. 14 
Judicial understanding of the social problems presented by test-
case litigation for children seems, then, to be hampered by severe 
problems in acquiring information and ideas. These problems are si-
multaneously exacerbated and eased (or evaded) by a set of judicial 
(and lawyer's) attitudes that might be called hyper-rationalism. 
Hyper-rationalism is essentially the substitution of reason for in-
formation and analysis. It has two components: first, the belief that 
reason can reliably be used to infer facts where evidence is unavailable 
or incomplete, and second, the practice of interpreting facts through a 
set of artificial analytic categories. The first component of hyper-
rationalism has three related aspects. In its first aspect, it is the as-
sumption that systematic evidence is generally superfluous to under-
standing social problems, since the behavior of people and institutions 
can be logically inferred from a general understanding of how people 
and institutions work. 15 In its second aspect, it is the assumption that, 
in the absence of a general understanding of how people and institu-
tions work, anecdotal evidence is generally sufficient, since the behav-
ior of people and institutions can be logically inferred from a few 
14. Much of Professor Mashaw's work is to 'a similar point. Consider his discussion of the 
Supreme Court's treatment of procedural due process: 
An attempt to address the cost-benefit question in a relatively rigorous fashion has demon-
strated our (and any reviewing court's) inability to obtain the necessary data to refute that 
presumption [of administrative regularity] convincingly. Analysis •.. must proceed on the 
basis of rough judgments, assumptions, and case comparisons. And, if the post-Eldridge 
Supreme Court cases are any guide, those approaches have produced dramatic variance in 
judicial judgments and a nearly incomprehensible jurisprudence. The Court in Eldridge, 
ignorant of the facts, affirms the legislative-administrative judgment. Its only alternative 
seems to be the Goldberg approach-an approach that, similarly uninformed, merely affirms 
a different, more interventionist, vision of the judicial function. 
J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 134-35 (1985). 
15. Professor Donald Horowitz describes one version of this aspect of hyper-rationalism in 
his important The Courts and Social Policy, where he talks of 
deriv[ing] behavioral expectations from what might be called the logical structure of incen· 
tives .... [C]ourts may consciously formulate rules of law calculated to appeal to the inter-
ests of "legal man" in rather the same way as the marketplace is thought to appeal to the 
interests of "economic man." . . . The problem with this, of course, is that it is deductive 
rather than empirical. There is no assurance that the judge has correctly formulated 'the 
structure of incentives: his logic and the logic of the actors affected by rules of law !hay 
begin from different premises. 
D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 49 (1977). 
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examples of their actual behavior under the relevant circumstances.16 
In its third aspect, it is the assumption that a description of social 
reality articulated. in one case may be taken as demonstrated fact in 
subsequent cases; it is, in other words, the application of stare decisis 
to evidence about social behavior.17 
All three attitudes recurred in the cases described in In the Interest 
of Children and are manifest in the evidence presented to and recited 
by the judges. 18 These attitudes are not, of course, uniquely judicial; 
they are probably common among public officials, who must formulate 
policy quickly and who are often temperamentally disinclined to learn 
about an issue through systematic reading. However, these attitudes 
are more problematic when held by judges, who lack the general ad-
ministrative experience and the particular subject-matter expertise 
that officials can use in interpreting sketchy information and who are 
ill-situated to revise a policy as experience with it teaches new lessons. 
The second component of hyper-rationalism is the practice of ana-
lyzing social problems in terms of a small set oflegal categories. Legal 
categories are troublesome and necessary for the same reason - they 
are a limited set of abstractions from social reality. Legal categories 
may be specially awkward when the law makes policy for families, 
since many of the values of family life are notoriously nonlegal and 
extra-rational. But even aside from this difficulty, drawbacks of ana-
lyzing a social problem in terms . of the legal categories available 
abound in In the Interest of Chilqren. For instance, judicial poli-
cymaking was repeatedly impaired by the fact that each of the five 
cases concerned (and the plaintiffs' lawyers and many of the judges 
were primarily interested in) a perplexing social problem, but the legal 
issue the cases presented was rarely an apt means of addressing that 
problem: The legal issue often spoke only indirectly to the social prob-
lem; to resolve the legal issue in a way that contributed to resolving 
the social problem often would have required a remedy far beyond 
judicial authority; and to define the legal issue so as to give a court 
scope in solving the social problem often risked creating legal doc-
trines with unanticipated and unwanted consequences. This point is 
16. This attitude also helps explain judicial willingness to accept as "proof" the conclusions 
of one or a few social science studies. Cf. id. at 274-84. 
17. Professor Mashaw neatly describes this third attitude: 
As precedent accretes, and as it is manipulated without reference to the particular circum-
stances from which it emerged, judicial activity may become increasingly insular. Rather 
than pursuing empirical inquiry into the social world, the legal culture may take on a life of 
its own-one in which cases stand for social facts and manipulation of formal categories 
replaces factual inquiry as the basis for decision making. 
J. MASHAW, supra note 14, at 59 (footnote omitted). 
18. I discuss this attitude toward evidence in a different context in Schneider, Free Speech 
and Corporate Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming). See also Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free Speech Cases?, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 302 (1984). ' 
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made with particular clarity by Professors Wald and Chambers in 
their discussion of OFFER, but it was or could have been made by 
each of the authors. Bellotti is centrally about the dilemmas of adoles-
cent pregnancy; Pennhurst about the best ways of treating the extraor-
dinarily various handicaps of the retarded; Norton about how the 
interests of mothers and children receiving welfare can be reconciled 
and served; Goss about how schools should handle the difficulties 
caused by integration and by changes in social attitudes towards disci-
pline and education. Yet the legal issue in each case was defined in 
terms of (usually procedural, sometimes substantive) due process, and 
each case was in part resolved by a provision for some kind of hearing. 
Due process devices were prominent in these cases not only be-
cause due process is the most convenient and plausible category for 
judicially addressing problems of family policy; due process also al-
lows judges to hope that the social complexity which escapes their im-
mediate understanding and reach will be taken into account in the 
newly revised process of decision. Yet, on the evidence of these cases, 
that hope seems unfounded. Few foster parents have used the hearing 
assured by OFFER; virtually every girl who sought judicial authoriza-
tion for an abortion after Bellotti rebeived it; hardly any mothers have 
fully pursued the procedural rights they secured in the process of 
which Norton was a part, and Professor Sugarman questions whether 
the fight over the Norton regulations "has made any important differ-
ence" (p. 429); and Professor Zimring and Mr. Solomon conclude that 
"what many commentators have called 'proceduralism' did students 
very little good but even less palpable harm" (p. 505). These results 
accord with Dean Yudof's conclusion that "[e]xperience with recent 
federal acts creating procedural rights for parents suggests that few 
take advantage of these statutory rights"19 and with Professor 
Mashaw's observation that "[t]he Goldberg requirement of extensive 
pretermination hearings has not produced a huge, or even very sub-
stantial, increase in the number of hearings held."20 
The difficulties presented by both components of judicial hyper-
rationalism can be seen by examining another common feature of 
these cases. Each case, with the possible exception of Bellotti, has cen-
trally to do with a bureaucracy. In each case, a court was asked to 
make a bureaucracy work "better." Few judges are equipped by train-
ing, experience, or temperament to understand bureaucracies. Never-
theless, their hyper-rationalism allows them to believe that their 
experience with conducting or evaluating trials makes them expert in 
governmental procedure of all kinds. 
The quality of bureaucratic work depends on the characteristics of 
19. Yudof, Legalization of Dispute Resolution, Distrust of Authority, and Organizational The· 
ory: lmpleme11ti11g Due Process for Students in the Public Schools, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 891, 906. 
20. J. MASHAW, supra note 14, at 251. 
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the particular bureaucracy, of its staff, and of its leaders. But because 
judges believe they can understand how all bureaucracies work 
through a priori reasoning, they resist inquiring into the individual 
character of a bureaucracy. Further, because judges are bound to use a 
limited number of legal categories in dealing with bureaucracies, it is 
hard for judges to interpret the law in a way that allows for variations 
between bureaucracies and within a single bureaucracy over time. The 
upshot of this, as we have just seen, is that judges try to improve bu-
reaucracies by imposing on them procedures that are, at best, pro 
forma or unused. The judicial cure for the ills of bureaucracy is more 
bureaucracy. 
Not only does hyper-rationalism lead courts to impose on bureau-
cracies and their clients procedures which are, like the hearings de-
scribed above, unused or meaningless. It also allows courts to 
underestimate greatly both the difficulties of persuading a bureaucracy 
to act in the way a court wishes and the resourcefulness of recusant 
bureaucrats. In other words, because courts substitute anecdote for 
evidence and legal categories for social analysis, they do not ask why 
bureaucrats think and act as they do. And because courts do not un-
derstand the assumptions of and pressures on bureaucrats, courts are 
ill-fitted to win their cooperation (and, because of the paucity of judi-
cial remedies and the scarcity of judicial time, ill-equipped to coerce 
it). 
OFFER exemplifies many of these features of the hyper-rational 
approach to bureaucracies. In that case, the social problem was to 
ensure that foster children are wisely treated, and thus a central ques-
tion was whether hearings would improve the bureaucracy's decisions. 
That question was to be answered for the whole country on the pasis 
of evidence about only two bureaucracies and of a small set of legal 
assumptions about how hearings generally affect bureaucratic deci-
sions. But it depends on an almost endless number of considerations, 
many of which will vary from one bureaucracy to another and within 
a single bureaucracy over time. Will a hearing officer make a better 
decision than a case worker? Can anything systematic be learned 
about the comparative sensitivity, training, experience, energy, or 
judgment of those two bureaucrats? Is the hearing officer a worn-out 
caseworker or a caseworker whose ability has been rewarded by pro-
motion? Is a caseworker's personal acquaintance with the people in-
volved a help or a hindrance? How important is speed in making a 
decision? How will hearings affect the morale of caseworkers? Their 
attitudes toward their clients? Their willingness to take necessary 
risks? Will the prospect of hearings encourage the caseworker to think 
more carefully, or merely to avoid making reviewable decisions? To 
follow rules more faithfully, or to doctor the paper record? Will hear-
ings lead to the formulation of clearer standards for the removal of 
children? Are clearer standards better standards, or is it preferable to 
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use vaguer standards that preserve a measure of discretion? Is the cost 
of hearings worth the price? Would the money have been better spent 
hiring another caseworker? Hiring another supervisor? Improving 
training programs? Improving record-keeping? Raising salaries to at-
tract abler caseworkers? Does the usefulness of hearings vary with the 
size of the bureaucracy? Will hearings affect a bureaucracy's ability to 
recruit and retain foster parents? Its ability to persuade natural par-
ents to put children in foster care? And so on and on. 
In these two sections, we have been examining how judicial under-
standing of public policy affecting children may be limited by judicial 
problems in acquiring and analyzing evidence. We have seen that for 
structural and attitudinal reasons, judges are exposed to only a frac-
tion of the information that they need and that they rely on an analytic 
framework which is often incomplete and ill-fitting. An obvious 
source of both information and analysis is the social sciences, and 
these cases often do indicate that the social sciences need to be better 
used. But I am not arguing that courts should simply shift the burden 
of decision onto the social sciences. For familiar and understandable 
reasons, social science evidence is too incomplete, social science theory 
is too fragile, and social science value choices are too problematic to 
justify such a tactic.21 
Nor does my criticism of the incompleteness of the information, 
analysis, and remedies in these cases imply that the only good policy is 
a global one, one that tries conclusively to understand and final1y to 
solve the whole problem all at once. On the contrary, there is much to 
be said for incrementalism, for what Professor Lindblom, in a famous 
article, called "the science of muddling through. "22 Because incre-
mentalism is a relatively cautious and modest approach to social pol-
icy, it seems plausible that courts might be able to make workable 
contributions to child welfare through incremental changes in policy. 
But even an incrementalist approach ought to be informed by the best 
available evidence and the most appropriate analytic framework. It is 
the apparent failure to achieve that level of understanding that raises 
questions about whether, even used incrementally, "test-case litigation 
[is] a sensible way to promote the welfare of children." 
Incrementalism is less promising a method of judicial child welfare 
reform than it might first seem for another reason. Incrementalism 
requires flexibility and a close and constant attention to the problem 
being addressed, so that changes can be made as successes and failures 
emerge. In some ways, courts seem well suited to those requirements. · 
Indeed, the traditional explanation of common law development 
neatly fits the incrementalist model. That explanation sees courts as 
deciding a long series of cases each dealing with a small part of a social 
21. See, as one example of many, c. LINDBLOM & D. COHEN, USABLE KNOWLEDGE (1979). 
22. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. Ao. REV. 79 (1959). 
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problem. From the series of holdings courts gradually induce a princi-
ple which is itself susceptible to gradual change as further holdings are 
assimilated. 
As a description of how courts. act:ually decide cases, this theory 
obviously has many deficiencies; but it 11).ay help direct us toward two 
impediments to successful incrementalism in test-case litigation over 
children's policy. First, such litigation is constitutional, not common 
law, litigation, and as such it tends to be deductive, not inductive. The 
Constitution provides not only a text to apply, but embodies principles 
of importance. This makes it easier for courts to feel they are equipped 
to deal with whole problems and not just increments of problems 
(since the text and principles presumably pre-empt many of the as-
pects of a problem that might otherwise be addressed incrementally) 
and it makes it harder for courts to respond flexibly (because it is 
harder to back down over an issue of principle and because of the need 
to maintain consistent application of a principle over the entire range 
of assimilable problems). Second, there may simply be too few cases 
to generate real familiarity with many of the problems children's pol-
icy raises and to allow for frequent small adjustments of policy. F.rom 
this point of view, test-case litigation involving numerous enforcement 
cases (like Brown) ought, ceteris paribus, to produce better judicial pol-
icy than litigation (like OFFER, Bellotti, Norton, and Goss) resolved in 
relatively few cases. Similarly, test-case litigation involving institu-
tions (like Pennhurst) ought to produce better judicial policy than 
other such reform efforts (again, like OFFER, Bellotti, Norton, and 
Goss), at least to the extent that the intensive interaction between court 
and institution which is thought to typify institutional litigation forces 
the court to learn in detail about the particular entity it seeks to 
change. Yet even these instances of better judicial policy (if such they 
be) import their own limits: only a greatly expanded judiciary could 
afford such attention to more than a very few areas of litigation, and it 
is exactly the intensity of judicial involvement that has provoked criti-
cism of the school desegregation and institutional cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I have devoted much of this review to what In the Interest of Chil-
dren suggests about the difficulties judges have in acquiring the infor-
mation needed to write policy for children and in interpreting the 
information they acquire, and I have inferred from the book that those 
difficulties may be both systematic and severe. Whether they are disa-
bling, whether they are worse than similar difficulties encountered by 
other branches of government, and whether they are curable are not 
questions that can be answered here. They are, however, questions not 
just of judicial capacity, but also of judicial legitimacy. Judicial policy 
ought not be weighed in the same scales as legislative and executive 
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policy, for the latter comes with the added legitimacy that democratic 
institutions have in a democratic system. Of course the question of 
judicial legitimacy in children's test cases can no more be resolved 
here than can the question of judicial competence. But it seems to me 
a danger that, in our appreciation for the successes of judicial policy 
which are symbolized by Brown v. Board of Education, we may forget 
its limitations, exaggerate its virtues, and become unduly contemptu-
ous of the democratic branches of government. This danger arises not 
so much from the debate over judicial review (a debate which has at-
tracted a good deal of intelligent, careful, and subtle thought) as from 
a less-considered but powerful attitude toward courts and legislatures 
which seems to underlie a good deal of what is described in In the 
Interest of Children and which I believe - and here I am partly rely-
ing on my own observations - has worked itself deep into the as-
sumptions and preferences of much of the elite legal community. The 
attitude comes in part from the reluctance of lawyers to consider that 
some of our enthusiasm for the kind of litigation described in this book 
undoubtedly comes from the fact that the "access" to government 
such litigation provides is access for us. For, seen in its bleakest light, 
In the Interest of Children suggests that that access is offered to a small 
group of lawyers unconstrained by the people they purport to be advo-
cates for, by the organizations that employ them, or by clients of any 
kind. They come from a group that already has disproportionate , 
power - the upper-middle-class graduates of elite law schools. They 
are suspicious of politics. They are at point after point (particularly on 
family law issues) resolutely out of sympathy with much of the popu-
lation. They prefer the rational style of courts to the emotive, demotic 
style of politics. In revealing, if surely not characteristic, moments, 
one hears them say things like, "No good was ever done by a statute, 
since only courts are capable of nuanced decisionmaking." In re-
vealing and less uncharacteristic moments, one sees them decide that 
facts about social policy - for instance, about a public institution's 
experience with affirmative action programs - ought to be kept secret 
because the public cannot properly understand those facts. 
Much of the attitude I have described is simply the natural con-
comitant of devoting oneself to social reform. It is thus logical that, as 
Professor Mnookin notes, today's children's advocates often remind 
one of their Progressive predecessors. They are similar in class back-
ground, similarly suspicious of politics, similarly convinced that polit-
ical decisions should be transferred to experts, and similarly confident 
of their own expertise. The irony of the comparison is that today's 
reformers are often attacking the institutions and ideas of the Progres-
sives - in OFFER, the foster care system and its faith in informal 
decisions; in Bellotti, moral and social views about adolescent preg-
nancy; in Pennhurst, the mental hospital; in Norton, restrictions on 
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welfare recipients; aoo in Goss, beliefs about the proper relationship 
between schools,· children, and the community. 
Yet the lessons of modesty and doubt this irony would seem to 
teach are widely resisted. This is apparent in the way lawyers in this 
kind of litigation call themselves or are called "public interest" law-
yers or "advocates for children." The statutes and programs that were 
challenged in these cases are surely vulnerable to many criticisms and 
may well be wrong. But many, perhaps most, Americans approve of 
them exactly in the belief that they serve both the public interest. and 
children, and each of the cases is at least ambiguous enough to make 
that belief plausible. The ambiguities of OFFER are made amply clear 
by Professors Wald and Chambers and by the presence of public inter-
est lawyers and children's advocates on three different fronts. OF-
FER's ambiguity becomes yet plainer when we recall that foster 
parents are, among other things, government employees who, in the 
suit, sought to inhibit government supervision of themselves. The stat-
ute in Bellotti was in part intended to reduce the number of abortions 
that took place in Massachusetts; but its supporters also believed that 
pregnant children benefit by discussing their situation with their par-
ents. The statute in Norton was partly meant to save tax money, but 
its supporters also thought that fathers should support their children 
and that children need that support. The defendants in Goss believed 
that informal discipline is better for the children being disciplined and 
that it helps administrators protect undisruptive children. Pennhurst 
may be an exception. 23 But given the complexity of the problems sur-
rounding asylums of all kinds, given 150 years of unsuccessful strug-
gles to make asylums work and to find alternatives to them, and given 
the weakening enthusiasm for the deinstitutionalization movement,24 
it is as difficult in Pennhurst as in the other cases confidently to allot to 
one side in the dispute exclusive understanding of the public welfare or 
unique insight into what children need. 
The failure to appreciate the lessons taught by the resemblance to 
the Progressives is also notably apparent in Professor Burt's criticism 
of the trial judge in Pennhurst. That judge, Professor Burt says, failed 
to understand his role as a moral teacher who "forces the defendants 
to reconsider their actions by raising the moral costs of those ac-
tions. . . . This is a considerable judicial power," Professor Burt 
writes, "akin to the force wielded by the greatest moral teachers from 
Gandhi to Christ to Socrates: making visible the vulnerability of those 
who suffer harm at the hands of wrong-doers" (p. 342). The judge 
23. Possibly because it is the only "institutional" case in the book, Pennhurst is the most 
frequent exception to the generalizations I have drawn from these case studies. 
24. See Richardson, Institutionalization and Deinstitutionalization of Children with Mental 
Retardation. in 1 CHILD DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH AND SOCIAL POLICY 318 (H. Stevenson & 
A. Siegel eds. 1984). 
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should employ that power to teach not only the litigants, but all of 
society; he must "reach out even beyond the immediate parties to this 
dispute, to show others that they had a stake in the just resolution of 
this dispute . . . , even though these others may not previously have 
defined themselves as parties to the dispute" (p. 328). 
The cautious judge may wish to remind himself what happened to 
Gandhi, Christ, and Socrates. He may wish to ask himself what quali-
ties of character, training, or experience equip him to use this kind of 
moral force. He may wish to ask himself what consequences this kind 
of moral ambition has for most people. 
One might recommend many other questions a judge confronted 
with Professor Burt's suggestions would want and have to ask. Let me 
confine myself, then, to two observations. First, a Gandhi is able to 
effect social change only against an opponent who shares basic moral 
views with him, and even then only where there is a single, overriding, 
and relatively simple moral issue. But the problems discussed with 
such richness in In the Interest of Children are exactly not such 
problems. They are problems of genuine difficulty, and to think of 
them as simple conflicts between the vulnerable and "wrong-doers" is 
both unkind to those on the "wrong" side and conducive to the scant-
ing of social complexity that plagues judicial policymaking. My sec-
ond observation responds to Professor Burt's image of the judge 
orchestrating social debate and negotiation over social issues. There is 
already a word for what Professor Burt wants the judge to create: the 
word is politics. 
